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CASE DIGESTS
ToRTs: Failure to Buckle Automobile Seat Belts
Kavanagh v. Butorac,-Ind. App.-, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966).
Plaintiff was a front-seat passenger in an auto which collided
with a motor vehicle driven by the defendant. As a result of the
collision the plaintiff suffered an injury resulting in the surgical
removal of his left eye and other injuries. It was clearly established that the auto in which the plaintiff was riding was equipped
with seat belts and that plaintiff's belt was unfastened at the time
of impact. Also it was highly probable that the damage to plaintiff's eye was brought about by its forcible contact with the rear
view mirror. The trial court acting without a jury awarded the
plaintiff a judgment of 100,000 dollars for personal injuries.
On appeal, held, the failure to "buckle up" does not as a matter of law constitute a bar to recovery under the doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk or avoidable consequences
where the expert testimony and the record as a whole is insufficient
to show that the injury could definitely have been avoided had the
passenger used his seat belt. The judgment was sustained.
After first finding that the award of damages was not excessive
and that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter
of law for failing to maintain a proper lookout, the court was
pressed with arguments stemming from the plaintiff's failure to
make use of available seat belts.
The court first focused its attention on the doctrine of avoidable consequences; one of several theories advanced by the defendant as a bar to plaintiff's recovery. In treating this theory, the
court pointed out that the gist of this doctrine lies in a rule of
damages by which certain items of loss are not recoverable when
caused by the failure of the injured party to exercise reasonable
care and diligence to minimize resulting loss or damage. Since the
doctrine comes into play after the establishment of proximate cause
in defendant's conduct, it is not a bar to recovery but rather a limitation on the amount of damages recoverable. In contrast, the doctrine of contributory negligence involves acts or omissions occurring before the defendant's wrongdoing has been completed, and
when it is proven that such acts or omissions precipitated the
proximate cause of the injury, the injured party is barred from
recovery.
After noting this distinction, the court was unwilling to invoke
the doctrine of avoidable consequences in the absence of a clearer
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and more sufficient showing that some part of the injury "would
not have occurred except for the fact that the plaintiff failed to
avoid the consequence of the tort by not fastening his seat belt."
The only proof submitted by the defendant pertaining directly to
causation consisted of the testimony of an expert on safety who offered an opinion that the plaintiff would not have collided with the
rear view mirror if his seat belt had been properly fastened. Since
the case was not tried before a jury, the trial judge was at liberty
to exercise his discretion in weighing this expert opinion. In the
face of these considerations, the court felt that it could not conclude
as a matter of law that the necessary but for causation was present
so as to enable it to invoke the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
These same limitations precluded application of both contributory
negligence and assumption of risk.
Although the decision does not fully explore the feasibility of
extending common law theories to the particular question involved,
it is worthy of attention from the single standpoint of extending
recognition to the possibility of placing an injured party under
some type of duty to make use of available seat belts. At least the
Indiana decision demonstrates an awareness of a judicial responsibility toward encouraging the policy favoring a constant use of
seat belts by the traveling public. Such a position is certainly refreshing when compared with the attitude that the problem entails
solely a matter of legislative rather than judicial cognizance. The
latter attitude prevailed for example, in Brown v. Kenrick, 192 So.
2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), in which a guest's failure to use
seat belts was offered as a defense to a claim of gross negligence
against the driver. The court sustained a motion to strike the
defense on the basis that it was not willing to enter an area of
legislative concern.
In the principal case, some of the important theoretical problems arising from the failure of an injured plaintiff to make use of
available seat belts were only briefly discussed by the court. For instance, it is certainly of some concern in those states which have
not adopted a comparative negligence statute, whether the omission
on the part of the plaintiff is labeled contributory negligence. If
such were the case, it is entirely conceivable that some courts might
reach the position that the plaintiff should be completely barred
from recovery. A similar result could follow if the theory of assumption of risk were employed. Although such holdings might be
highly desirable as means for encouraging a safety conscious public,
it is questionable whether these goals can be justified to the exclusion of the private interest of the law: adjusting and weighing the
interests and wrongdoings of the litigants themselves. From this
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standpoint, such holdings would seem unwarranted since the injured plaintiff's omitted act in no way increased the risk of initial
collision but only the risk that certain injuries would be aggravated as a result of the initial collision. Thus, the existence of indistinguishable causation, which underlies the rationale of contributory negligence, is not present in the seat belt situation. Stated
another way, the failure to use seat belts does not create a risk
which would increase the probability of defendant's act becoming
tortious, but only a risk with respect to the extent of damages resulting from such tortious conduct.
Once the fault concept is placed in proper perspective the problem is reduced to the discovery of a rule pertaining only to damages. In the instant case the court was of the opinion that the doctrine of avoidable consequences would serve such a purpose. The
burden of proof in establishing this doctrine as a limitation on recovery rests, of course, with the party asserting it. The critical
question here concerns whether this burden should be cast in terms
of but for causation or some lesser standard such as highly probable cause. In view of the range of opinion concerning the precise
safety effect of seat belts, the proof of mere but for causation may
appear overly harsh. At any rate, it is not unreasonable to conclude that most of the litigation dealing with the question of seat
belts will turn on the burden and adequacy of proof. The recent
case of Mortensen v. Southern Pac. Co.,- Cal. App.2d-, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 851 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) indicates that the proof question will
constitute the battleground in Federal Employment Liability Act
cases. In this case a railroad employee was driving defendant's
truck when it was struck in the rear by another vehicle, the driver
of which was drunk. The defendant's truck rolled down an embankment causing the employee to be thrown out. Under FELA
requirements, liability attaches if injury or death results in whole
or in part by reason of any defect or insufficiency due to the railroad's negligence. The question before the court was whether the
failure to provide seat belts, under the evidence submitted, was
sufficient to send the case to the jury. By an affirmative holding
on this question, the court has in effect forced the dispute to turn
on the degree and sufficiency of proof before the finder of facts.
CONST=TiONAL LAW:

Commerce Clause

Tupman Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
Plaintiff, a dealer in imported meats, instituted this action for
a declaratory judgment that two Tennessee statutes dealing with
imported meat were unconstitutional. One of these was a labeling
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statute and the other set forth a licensing requirement. The labeling statute provided that anyone who sold or offered any imported
meat in whatever form was required to identify the product and its
origin by a label on the meat, or in some cases, a conspicuous sign
in lieu of the label. The licensing statute required wholesalers and
retailers of certain imported meat to register and pay a significant
fee although the fee could be dispensed with for periods when it
was determined that there was a shortage of native meats.
A three-judge court was convened to hear the case, and it determined that the two acts were in conflict with the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution in that they imposed unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions and burdens upon interstate and foreign commerce. The labeling statute was attacked upon the basis that it would require handlers of meat to trace its
origin whereas the prior practice had been that foreign and domestic meats were indiscriminately co-mingled. That compliance with
the statute in light of the earlier practice would be burdensome
was said to be self-evident. Furthermore, it was noted that the
burden was discriminatory since meats produced within the United
States were exempt from any labeling requirement. With regard to
the licensing statute, the court noted that it also imposed unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions and burdens upon commerce,
but the statutes were viewed together as one regulatory scheme.
The defendant argued that the legislation should be upheld on
the basis that the state could protect its citizens from fraud and
deception through exercise of its police power. To support this
argument, defendant pointed out that foreign meat is frozen in the
country of origin and suggested that the consumer is therefore deceived because he thinks he is buying a fresh product. The court
apparently conceded that fresh products are, in some respects,
superior, but stated that there was no evidence that the consumer
supposed the product he purchases to be fresh, nor was there evidence that such products were represented to be fresh. In addition,
the argument suffered because the consumer was not entitled to
information about domestic meats which had been frozen. All of
the cases cited by the defendant upholding regulation to prevent
fraud and deception were distinguished on the basis that they dealt
with legislation concerning the nature, quality or quantity of the
product whereas it was said that the labeling statute did "nothing
except inform the public that a meat product had its origin in a
"
Tupman Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252 F. Supp.
foreign country..
641, 649 (1966).
Whatever the motives behind legislation of this nature, it is
extremely susceptible to an inference that its purpose was to pro-
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tect domestic, if not local, producers. In other words, it is a backdoor attempt at the state level to prohibit or impede the importation of meat from abroad. Regardless of the argument that importation of meat places a ceiling upon the producers' prices and
thereby keeps them from advancing with the cost of living, regulation of commerce remains an area where the federal right
under the commerce clause is predominant, and the state can
act only in areas of legitimate local interest. See Bison, Economic
Protective Powers of States Under the Commerce Clause, 38 GEO.
L. J. 590 (1950). With this in mind, it is expected that the courts
will continue to thwart direct or indirect attempts by states aimed
at keeping "the system unimpaired by competition from afar."
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 519 (1935).
Quite clearly, the only bases upon which a labeling act could be
upheld as valid state legislation would be to establish that the
measure was not enacted for economic reasons, but instead either is
designed to protect the citizens against fraud or is supported by
health or safety considerations. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 335 U.S.
808 (1948). According to the reasoning of the case under consideration, this burden cannot be met since labeling indicates nothing
more than the origin and that apparently is not enough to bring
it within the area of permissible state legislation. Even apart from
the question of legitimate local interest, it does not appear that
this type of statutory regulation could be amended so as to avoid
a charge of burdening commerce.
The reasons for presenting this case are twofold. First, it is
apparently the only case thus far dealing with this exact question.
Second, Nebraska has a recently enacted labeling statute which
is quite similar to that presented for analysis in the above case.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-2,211-16 (Supp. 1965).
From what appears, it seems doubtful that the Nebraska statute could withstand
attack on constitutional grounds.

PROPERTY: Easements
Reliable Washer Serv. v. Delmar Associates, 49 Misc. 2d 348, 267
N.Y.S.2d 419 (City Ct. of Long Beach 1966).
Plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant's grantor under which he would install and maintain one washing machine and one dryer in the laundry room on each floor of grantor's
apartment building. The agreement was to run for five years and
two months terminating December 31, 1968. Plaintiff also agreed
to pay 250 dollars quarterly for the privilege of so placing his equip-
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ment. The seventh paragraph of the contract provided that the
agreement shall "bind the parties hereto, and shall bind and enure
to the legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties
respectively." The basic question raised was whether the defendant grantee of the apartment building was bound by the agreement.
The plaintiff relied on a New York decision, Polner v. Arling Realty, 194 Misc. 831, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1949), in contending that the agreement was a lease. The court distinguished the
Polner case on the basis that in that case there was a grant of
exclusive possession of specific space, rather than a mere right to
install one washer and one dryer in each laundry room. The court
held that absent the exclusive possession of a specific portion of
the premises, the agreement was not a lease and must therefore be
a license. The defendant grantee would not be bound by the license agreement in that such an agreement is terminable at will.
CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING w= LAND 16 (1929).
In looking at the operative facts of the instant case to determine the legal theory which would best serve the intention of the
original parties and also do substantial justice, both the plaintiff
and the court apparently neglected to consider that what the parties had created was in fact an easement. There are a number of
factors in the agreement that support the theory that it was the
intention of the parties to create an agreement in the nature of an
easement. First, paragraph seven provides that subsequent parties
were to be bound. Second, the specific time, five years and two
months, tends to show that the time element was carefully considered and quite important. Third, the amount of money paid by
the plaintiff and the amount of investment in equipment and time
would clearly indicate that the plaintiff intended not to have an
agreement terminable at will. The fact that there was granted no
right of exclusive possession of a specific area, which barred a
finding that a lease had been created, is irrelevant to finding that
an easement had been granted the plaintiff. The agreement was
in writing; thus the Statute of Frauds would not be a bar. Although all the necessary elements of an easement were present in
the instant case, this theory of recovery was ignored. The court
seemed to hold that because the agreement was not a lease it was
therefore a license. This is not a necessary conclusion. Had the
plaintiff pleaded the existence of an easement, the court would
have found that the facts showed all the necessary elements establishing that type of interest, and also fulfilled the apparent intention of the parties.
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TORTS: Parental Immunity
Briere v. Briere,- N.H. -,

224 A.2d 588 (1966).

The defendant's wife brought suit in behalf of their two children to recover for injuries which the children suffered as a result
of the alleged negligence of their father in driving an automobile.
The lower court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
basis that a minor unemancipated child cannot sue his parent-the
parental immunity doctrine. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed and held that the continual erosion of the parental
immunity doctrine in recent years requires that it now be overturned. The court further held that since the children may sue
their father, a fortiori the wife may sue in her own behalf for
consequential damages she sustained because of the injuries to
the children.
The Briere case, at present, in the latest in a growing number
of minority decisions which consider that the policy reasons behind
the parental immunity doctrine no longer out-weigh underlying
principles of tort law: (1) the law of torts is a means for creating
and protecting rights, as well as a vehicle for compensating harm
caused by others and (2) tort law is a field where "conditions are
not static but dynamic, as the law grows and changes to meet new
social and economic conditions." Briere v. Briere, - N.H. -, 224
A.2d 588, 590 (1966). The court recognized that the parental immunity doctrine in most jurisdictions is a "court-made rule" and
also, in deference to the legislative function, that the state legislature had had ample opportunity to exercise its prerogative but had
chosen not to act. From these principles, the court assaulted three
of the primary policy reasons which support the doctrine of parental immunity still enforced in the majority of jurisdictions.
The first policy reason is that the threat of fraud and collusion
in intra-family litigation is great. However, the court noted that
New Hampshire has previously allowed suits between husband and
wife, relatives, host and guest, and intimate friends, and in all instances the litigation involves the same likelihood of collusion. The
courts, having proved themselves competent to handle those cases,
are equally equiped to "ferret out" collusive suits when minors
and their parents are parties. "In short, we are unwilling to espouse the doctrine that the mere opportunity for fraud and collusion should be an insuperable barrier to an honest and meritorious
action by a minor." Id. at -, 224 A.2d at 590.
The second policy behind the doctrine of parental immunity,
"depletion of the family exchequer," was refuted by the court by
realizing that few suits would be brought against a parent unless
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the parent had the means to satisfy the judgment, and any parent
with means will inevitably carry insurance. Unwilling to predicate liability on the presence or absence of insurance alone, the
court added: "[T]he prevalence of insurance cannot be ignored in
determining whether a court should continue to discriminate against
a class of individuals by depriving them of a right enjoyed by all
other individuals." Id. at -, 224 A.2d at 590.
The last policy, "the preservation of parental authority and
family harmony," was recognized by the court to be fundamental
to the validity of the doctrine. The court observed that the same
policy argument arises, but is not determinative in suits which may
be maintained between spouses, or between a minor unemancipated
child and his parent under all of the exceptions to the doctrine
that exist in many jurisdictions: for example, actions on contracts,
actions to protect property rights and actions for injuries caused by
willfull or intentional conduct of the parent. An opposing policy
which the court found to be of equal weight to the policy of preserving family harmony is that "a parent nearly always desires
above all to protect and benefit his children . . . ." Id. at -, 224
A.2d at 591. Thus, the doctrine of parental immunity was put to
rest as being supported by policy considerations which no longer
have any substantial bearing on contemporary requirements and
conditions.
In Go~ler v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin also obliterated the parental immunity
doctrine. The court noted that the Wisconsin Legislature had previously considered a statute that would have abolished parental immunity but it had refused to act. Nevertheless, as in the Briere
case, the Wisconsin court felt that since the rule had originated in
the courts, it could die in the courts as well. Id. at 412, 122 N.W.2d
at 198. In contrast to the Briere case, the Wisconsin court fashioned
a rule which it thought best gives substance to what little policy
still supports the parental immunity doctrine, rather than rejecting
the doctrine in totality. The court chose to retain the doctrine
"(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act
involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services,
and other care." Id. at 413, 122 N.W. 2d at 198.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held in Fisher v. State, 154
Neb. 166, 47 N.W.2d 349 (1951), that a parent may be civilly or
criminally liable for assault of her child if the correction is "immoderate and unreasonable." In Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180,
24 N.W. "130 (1885), the court held that one in loco parentis may be
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civilly liable for negligently failing to provide sufficient warm clothing for the plaintiff. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
has indicated a willingness to find exceptions to the doctrine of
parental immunity, as have most courts. Yet in the more recent
case of Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959), the
court refused to consider abolishing the doctrine, and further refused to allow a minor unemancipated child to sue his parent's
employer for the negligent acts of his parent acting within the
scope of his employment. Even though the father-employee is still
personally immune from suit instigated by his child in most jurisdictions, the majority of cases in these jurisdictions nevertheless allow recovery against the employer, as being one of the many exceptions to the doctrine. Comment, A Proposed Modification of the
Parental Immunity Doctrine, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 339, 343 (1962).
This exception clearly indicates that courts have gone to anomalous
extremes to avoid the doctrine, realizing that the employer has a
right over against his negligent employee.
In recent years, the assault on the doctrine of parental immunity has strengthened. Yet in Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247,
163 A.2d 147 (1960), the court retained the doctrine by a four to
three vote. But as noted in Briere, "the dissenting minority counters with an equally impressive collection dominated by text writers, professors and dissident judges maintaining the opposite opinion." - N.H. -, -, 224 A.2d 588, 589 (1966). It appears that
Wisconsin and New Hampshire have charted a well reasoned course
that will inevitably be followed by many other jurisdictions.

